To begin, you need to know that the initial request was filed by SAD63 for a Summary Judgement against the claims Regan's had filed (in violation of her Constitutional rights) via the Federal Court system (and then tacked on her Maine Court claims as well). According to the U.S. District Court, "Summary Judgment 'should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' " Bottom Line: In essence the judge is saying ...If , in this case, the Plaintiff has shown enough via the evidence and relationship to precendent law to conclude that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff then a Summary Judgement should not be rendered - BUT if the Defendant can show that there is no evidence to support the Plaintiff 's claim to believe a reasonable jury would render a verdict in support of the Plaintiff's claim, then the judge should render a Summary Judgment - which means to throw out the Plaintiff's claim.
First you need to understand that Regan, the former superintendent and the plaintiff in this lawsuit, made ONE basic claim (with some "stringers") that is a Constitutional law issue and therefore an issue to be determined at the United States District Court level. Regan also made several additional claims that come under Maine state law jurisdiction.
I'm going to present the issues here in the same order (Federal Court first and Maine Court Second).
Regan's one basic claim that is a Constitutional law issue is her allegation that the SAD63 School Board "acting under color of state law, violated her federal due process, privacy, free speech, and equal protection rights." She makes this claim because with respect to the "due process" component, she was deprived her rights in property via continued employment and her liberty via her reputation. (Under this flag of Constitutional law, Regan is claiming she was fired illegally - without the proper procedures being met, was denied Due Process and thereby denied her rights and liberty under the law.)
Part of Regan's argument is that she had been hired by a joint board consisting of SAD63 and CSD8 (Consolidated School District 8 comprised of the towns of Aurora, Osborn, Amherst and Great Pond) and, as such, could only be terminated by the same joint board. Since the termination action in question was committed solely by SAD63, Regan's position is that it is illegal.
The Defendants (SAD63) position is that there was no official "joint board" and that the arrangement was only a cost-savings arrangement. The SAD63 Board further states Regan had a predeprivation due process (which means the First Step in a Two-Step due process precedure - my explanation) in which all due process rights were respected. The Defendants argue that Regan fails (in the arguments before the District Court) to adequately plead anything else in support of her claim (that her Constitutional rights were violated).
The District Court judge reviewed the requirements of the applicable law (Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act) and decided that the question was: "whether Regan received, or stands to receive sufficient process from the State of Maine." The judge determined, after wading through several precedent cases, that "Before a tenured public employee is discharged, she is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against her, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present her side of the story." "These are the 'minimum procedural requirements' that must be afforded as a matter of federal law."
Now, I will tell you that Regan (through her attorney) went on extensively to allege that there were more reasons (the "stringers") behind SAD63's termination of Regan's employment which Regan alleges she was not officially noticed, but the judge gave this allegation no merit. The judge found that the investigative findings provided by SAD63's attorney (Wade) on May 12, 2008 to Regan with a list of the grounds being considered sufficient to justify the termination proceedings.
The judge also found the termination hearings afforded Regan followed Wade's findings and notification to Regan sufficient to meet the predeprivation requirements of the law. Regan was afforded opportunities to present her side of the story (both orally and in writing) at meetings on both July 18 and 29 prior to the Board's vote that called for her termination. All of the extraneous issues Regan tried to inject re: additional reasons various members of the Board used (to terminate her) but had not "noticed" her, were addressed by the judge and dismissed as issues which the judge said Regan should have expected. The judge further stated "All of this litigious conduct commenced following the October 22,2007, board meeting and there can be no doubt that Regan fully understood the correlation between the issue of the tape recordings and her institution of charges against the Board. Regan must have understood at the time that her commencement of legal proceedings against the SAD63 Board and a majority of its members was something that could galvanize the nascent movement against her continued employment, whether it actually did or not."
The judge explained that her sole reason for conducting the May 7, 2009 limited oral argument "was out of concern that the parties (Regan and SAD63) were overlooking legal authority (available via postdeprivation proceedings that could cure any alleged shortcomings in the predeprivation process). The judge's issue here was that, if Regan's position was correct that the CSD8 Board needed to be a party to the termination consideration/procedure in order for the termination to be legal or if the SAD63 Board was so biased against Regan as to have prevented her from receiving adequate due process at the predeprivation, was there adequate protection for Regan via the postdeprivation process to afford her the required due process?
Conclusion: After all of the arguments were heard and all of the legal precedent cases were thoroughly reviewed, the Judge Ruled: (1) Regan was given notice of the causes the SAD63 was considering for termination via the written investigative report on May 12, 2008, (2) the (U.S.) Supreme Court held (in a precedent case) that "the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions" in a due process tribunal does not build an unconstitutional, structural bias into administrative, due process proceedings, (3) "in the instant case, the ultimate decisionmaker is the Commissioner of Education, who did not preside over the underlying investigation and discharge proceeding." And "state law provides the Commissioner with the authority to afford a discharged superintendent with a full-blown postdeprivation administrative hearing." Therefore, the judge concluded Regan had failed to "demonstrate that the State of Maine will not afford her an adequate postdeprivation administrative hearing before the Commissioner and all appearances are to the contrary. (emphasis added by me). "The statute that governs the discharge of superintendents flatly provides for an appeal before the Commissioner of Education and, moreover, provides that the Commissioner 'shall (that wording is usually indicative of a mandate - my wording here) hold a hearing as part of the appeal'." "This hearing should ensure that the (SAD63's) Board's determination of disputed issues of fact and discipline will not be the ultimate determination. Under all of the available precedent discussed (within this decision), even if there exists sufficient evience to support a finding that SAD63's decision was poisoned by personal bias on certain board members, a postdepreivation administrative hearing in which the Commissioner makes de novo (meaning - once more) findings on disputed factual matters and discipline will satisfy due process requirements. I therefore recommend that the Court grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment against (Regan's claim of Constitutional violation of due process) so that, hopefully, the state process can run its course without much further ado."
So that pretty much cleared out Regan's claim of SAD63 violating her Constitutional rights (unless she decides to appeal to a higher court which must be done within 10 days of the issuance of the decision - or by May 22,2009.)
Now - On to Regan's State Law Claims:
On the First and Second counts, Regan asserts:
- SAD63 violated Maine's Freedom of Access Act and the Superindentent Discharge Statute by not publically voting and providing her with a right to tell her side of the story before the Board could convene an investigation related to her potential discharge
On the Third count, Regan asserts:
- a violation of her right to review her personnel file (this appears to have been addressed - see below). It appears Regan had filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue however, I believe I understood the attorneys to say the file had been provided (with some explanation as to the delay in the Defendants ability to access it in the first place). That may explain the judge's decision on this motion as follows.
On the Fourth and Fifth count, Regan asserts:
- a breach of contract and tortious (pertaining to tort law) interference with her contract
On the Sixth (?) listed as Seventh count, Regan asserts:
- a claim of defamation under the Main Tort Claims Act
Additionally, Regan has added two more counts falling under the asgis of the Maine Human Rights Act:
Count Eight asserts:
- Whistleblower retaliation which relates back to the taped minutes which were knowingly removed and then returned to the administrative office and then the after-the-fact "theft report" filed with the police.
Count Nine asserts"
- Retaliation for filing a charge with the Maine Human Rights Commission.
The judge ruled on these matters as follows:
"...I RECOMMEND that the court GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ...IN PART, by entering judgment for Defendants on ... the solitary federal claim; enter an order remanding the remaining state law issues and claims to the Maine Superior Court; and MOOT Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment."
NOTE: If you are interested in reading the list of charges the SAD63 noticed as Cause for Termination, please make the request in a Comment following this blog and I will provide them (either in a response Comment or in a blog).
As for how long this will go on - or how much the legal costs will end up totaling, that pretty much depends on Regan - how much longer she wants to drag this out (the Appeal process through the courts plus the State of Maine Commissioner of Education). It would appear only the courts can grant Regan any financial remedy which is what she is "requesting." And if the Commissioner, after hearing all of the evidence to be presented, determines the termination was legal and due process was accorded under "Maine law conditions for the discharge of a superintendent", many of the Maine Court issues would appear to be addressed as well.
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